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The joint IASB and FASB Discussion Paper “Preliminary Views on Revenue Recognition in 
Contracts with Customers” from December 2008 proposes a single standard for the 
accounting of contracts with customers. It aims to eliminate inconsistencies in current IFRSs 
and US GAAP. A contract with customers consists of performance obligations, which are 
defined as a promise to transfer an asset (good or service) to the customer. The contract is 
recognized as a (net) contract asset or contract liability. Revenue is recognized when the 
entity satisfies a performance obligation. The key criterion is the transfer of control of the 
asset to the customer (rather than the entity’s activities to satisfy the obligation). Measurement 
of the performance obligation and the contractual rights would be based on the transaction 
price, which is allocated to the performance obligations based on their stand-alone selling 
prices. A performance obligation should not be adjusted subsequently except if it is deemed 
onerous. The proposed revenue recognition principle is conceptually significantly different 
from the current rules, and it would change accounting practice particularly for construction 
contracts and for multi-element contracts. The preliminary views of IASB and FASB stated in 
the Discussion Paper contain a number of fundamental issues, on which the boards invite 
views from their constituencies.  
In line with the EAA Financial Reporting Standards Committee’s mission statement, the 
objective of this paper is to collate and bring to the IASB’s attention research that is relevant 
to the deliberations and to point out research needs for an adequate way forward to the issues 
the IASB aims at resolving. The accounting for revenue recognition is clearly an international 
issue and, hence, our review includes research from all over the world. Our emphasis is on 
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research from European countries, although we note at the outset that there is relatively little 
European research that studies this issue. The papers we survey give a sense for the broad 
methodological approaches and results in the area. However, we do not claim that they 
represent a comprehensive list of work in this area.  
Our comment is organized as follows: In the next section, we present prior research according 
to the methodology used, namely, theoretical (a priori) research, then analytical research, and 
finally empirical research. In the subsequent section, we respond to the main questions of the 
Discussion Paper.  
1. Prior research  
1.1. Theoretical (a priori) research  
Theoretical (a priori) research uses logical arguments and conceptual thinking to derive 
solutions to a problem, based on normative theory. In the following, we discuss two themes 
that are related to the themes in the Discussion Paper.  
The Discussion Paper is based on the asset-liability model that is favoured by the boards. 
While this model does have some merits, the alternative revenue-expense model that was the 
conceptual basis of accounting standards for many decades also has merits. Dichev (2008) 
lists three of them: (i) The revenue-expense model follows the underlying business process of 
earnings generation and reflects business reality; (ii) conceptually, income determination is 
clearer and more useful than assets and liabilities; and (iii) earnings is the most important 
output of the accounting system. In a long-term empirical analysis Dichev and Tang (2008) 
find that the increased use of the asset-liability model in the U.S. had negative effects on the 
quality of accounting earnings.  
Despite the emphasis on the asset-liability model, the revenue recognition concept in the 
Discussion Paper is mixed and includes elements of a revenue-expense model. For example, 
the proposed relative stand-alone price allocation of the contract transaction price is an 
allocation (of the difference between stand-alone prices and the contract price) rather than an 
individual measurement of the respective performance obligations or any group of such 
obligations. A similar observation holds for the continuous recognition of, say, a warranty 
obligation (as discussed in paragraph A28 of the Discussion Paper), which is another 
allocation.  
There are alternative revenue recognition concepts that have not been discussed in the 
Discussion Paper. For example, Wüstemann and Kierzek (2005) propose an asset and liability 
transaction approach that is derived from an appeal to the legal existence of the entity’s right 
of obtaining consideration. They suggest that “revenue should be recognized when the 
enterprise obtains the right to consideration in exchange for the substantive fulfilment of its 
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performance obligation” (Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005, p. 95). The difference to the 
proposed revenue recognition model in the Discussion Paper is based on the satisfaction of 
performance obligations is gradual and based on legal claims rather than on economic criteria. 
Wüstemann and Kierzek (2007) discuss their approach for construction contracts and 
Wüstemann and Kierzek (2008) for service contracts. In many cases, their approach would 
imply later revenue recognition than under the Discussion Paper’s model. 
However, Nobes (2006) and Alexander (2006) argue against Wüstemann and Kierzek in 
support of an approach that is more similar to the Discussion Paper. A PAAinE (2007) 
Discussion Paper favors a continuous approach in contrast to a critical events approach taken 
by the Discussion Paper.  
We conclude that the revenue recognition approach in the Discussion Paper attempts to 
achieve conceptual consistency, and it clearly increases consistency relative to the existing set 
of standards. However, the literature casts some doubt that their appeal to the asset-liability 
model as the consistent concept is the best way to regulate revenue recognition.  
1.2. Analytical research  
Analytical research stresses the fact that accounting provides additional information for 
specific purposes. Revenue recognition rules influence the information content in the 
accounting system (see, e.g., Christensen and Demski, 2003, particularly Chapter 14; Liang, 
2001). In essence, revenue recognition rules determine the timing when new information is 
recorded in the accounting system. Most of the literature deals with stewardship issues and 
potential welfare effects of early or late recognition for that objective.2 Accounting systems 
aggregate individual information into earnings, which makes it difficult or impossible to 
disentangle the individual information, and reduces the comparability of the information 
produced by applying different methods. It is not surprising that most of the literature finds 
ambiguous results about the preferability of certain revenue recognition methods, thus, 
opposing the idea of a single consistent concept that is the best for all situations.  
Antle and Demski (1989) study revenue recognition from an information (consumption 
smoothing of risk averse agents) and a stewardship (providing incentives to agents) 
perspective. They show that the preferability of early or late recognition depends on the time 
in which the risk of the outcome of the production process is resolved. The situation becomes 
more complicated if earnings management is considered as well (see Christensen and Demski, 
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2003, Chapter 14). Antle and Demski stress the trade-offs that are incurred and that prohibit 
an easy solution to any revenue recognition discussion.  
Liang (2000) examines a setting in which the manager is privately informed. Revenue 
recognition partially conveys that private information at different times. He shows that 
recognition is most useful at the time when the moral hazard problem is most critical (and not, 
e.g., at the time when the most uncertain event takes place). If the manager can self-report the 
private information, late recognition is preferable because it can be more effectively used to 
control earnings management incentives.  
Glover (2004) sketches a model that examines how a robust revenue recognition standard 
would look like in a setting similar to those of Antle and Demski (1989) and Liang (2004). If 
the owners and the manager do not know exactly the governing probability distributions, 
earlier recognition can be superior to late recognition.  
Liang and Zhang (2006) find that flexible revenue recognition rules can be preferable to 
stringent rules because their choice can convey additional information about the quality of the 
underlying information about the earnings process. However, if the incentives for earnings 
management are strong, stringent rules may become more desirable. 
The Discussion Paper does include some rules that require judgment, e.g., the identification of 
performance obligations and their measurement. The literature suggests that leaving some 
discretion on the recognition of revenue to management does not necessarily have a negative 
effect but can carry additional information. However, it is difficult to describe in more general 
terms, as standards do, the settings in which such a benefit is likely to obtain.  
Dutta and Zhang (2002) consider a multi-period agency model in which in each period a 
manager receives information about the production environment and makes productive 
decisions. They examine how goods that are produced in one period and sold in a subsequent 
period should be measured to provide optimal incentives to the manager. Although, formally, 
they do not study contracts with customers because they assume the selling price is uncertain, 
their analysis is still interesting also for contracts. If revenue is realized only when the goods 
are sold a residual-income based contract achieves optimal incentives, whereas revenue 
recognition based on the market price of the goods fails to provide effective incentives. The 
reason is that the market price anticipates the manager’s future performance and, thus, does 
not provide incentives to deliver that performance. Moreover, the market price aggregates 
future cash flows differently from what would be optimal for performance evaluation. Dutta 
and Zhang, thus, show that the accounting for decision usefulness and for stewardship can 
differ significantly.  
Dutta and Reichelstein (2005) study accounting rules for multi-period construction contracts 
with the objective to find goal-congruent performance measures. Goal congruence aligns the 
performance measure with the owners’ value maximization objective, independent of possible 
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differences in their time horizons, discount rate, and structure of the compensation function. 
Thus, the performance measure must reflect value generation in each period. Obviously, the 
completed-contract method does not satisfy this criterion because it recognizes revenue only 
in the period of the completion of the contract, thus biasing the performance measures in all 
periods. The percentage-of-completion method does better, but also does not achieve goal 
congruence because it does not include the effects of discounting, which is fundamental to 
value generation (based on the net present value). Dutta and Reichelstein develop a so-called 
present-value-percentage-of-completion method that eliminates the time inconsistency and 
achieves goal congruence.  
Mohnen and Bareket (2007) consider a setting in which a manager must rank different 
projects according to their value generation. They show that any goal-congruent performance 
measure must include a revenue recognition rule that differs from cash flows. The revenue 
recognition must be such that it effectively annuitizes the net present value of a project.  
Several studies compare the completed-contract and percentage-of-completion methods for 
construction contracts in an agency setting where accounting information is used as a 
performance measure for a manager’s compensation. The models typically consider a two-
period setting in which the percentage-of-completion method includes some information from 
the second period already in the first-period earnings. However, since the performance 
measure aggregates different pieces of information, the contract cannot make use of these 
pieces individually, hence, the two methods provide information that is not directly 
comparable.  
Hofmann (2005) shows that without the possibility of the renegotiation of the compensation 
contract of the manager, the percentage-of-completion method dominates the completed-
contract method because the percentage-of-completion method provides more information in 
the early period. However, under renegotiation too much information in early periods can be 
detrimental for the renegotiation phase because the information can be used to fine-tune the 
second-period contract, which is anticipated by the manager who adjusts the first-period 
effort. Hofmann shows that the preferability of the two methods depends on how much 
information the first-period earnings provide about the second period. Schöndube (2008) 
studies a similar setting but considers unverifiable information. He finds that if long-term 
activities are more important than short-term activities, the percentage-of-completion method 
dominates the completed-contract method.  
Arnegger and Hofmann (2007) study the optimal allocation base for the percentage-of-
completion method in a situation without renegotiation. They find that input- and output-
based measures for the degree of completion are rarely optimal; the optimal allocation base 
depends on the productivity of the agent and the risk in the periods of construction. 
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Dobler (2008) argues that the percentage-of-completion method gives more relevant 
information, while the completed-contract leads to more reliable information. For 
performance measurement, completed-contract has the effect of providing negative incentives 
for starting construction contracts, as managers must recognize losses, but not gains. In this 
sense, Dobler argues that percentage-of-completion is more neutral, but at the cost of a higher 
opportunity for earnings management. 
Although the models focus on a variety of economic effects, they generally support the 
percentage-of-completion method over the completed-contract method for long-term 
contracts. If the revenue recognition criteria suggested in the Discussion Paper lead to an 
increase in the use of the completed-contract method, e.g., in the construction industry, the 
effects may be negative. However, earnings management opportunities are greater under the 
percentage-of-completion method and should be considered as well.  
1.3. Empirical research  
In this section we cover empirical literature related to revenue recognition. There are several 
strains of research covered. We start with accounting choice, i.e., how reporting entities tend 
to make choices on reporting revenue in different situations and what factors may determine 
these choices. Next, we survey studies on the quality of accounting information, in which the 
focus shifts from the producers to the users of financial statements. The last part of this 
section covers miscellaneous issues, such as how accounting standards should be written. 
Starting with accounting choice, there are several studies that have focused on internet and 
other IT companies. This is because many issues in reporting revenue have been especially 
important in this industry. Many new accounting pronouncements pertaining to this industry 
have been issued, especially in the US. Both Altamuro et al (2005) and Srivastava (2008) 
study the effects of new accounting pronouncements that decreased discretion in reporting 
revenues. While Altamuro et al found a reduction in earnings management following the new 
pronouncement, Srivastava identified no such effect. Both studies indicate a decrease in 
usefulness of revenue numbers after the introduction of less discretion. Bowen et al (2002) 
find that earnings management is stronger for internet firms with higher cash burn rate 
(indicating a high need for external financing). Chamberlain (2002), however, suggests 
caution in interpreting these results. 
Besides the studies that focus on internet and the IT industry, there are some more general 
studies on accounting choice. Larson and Brown (2004) show that there is diversity in 
practice for reporting revenue on long-term contracts, suggesting the need for stricter 
regulation. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) study in what situations different income 
statement items are used for earnings management. They find that revenues are accelerated 
especially for firms that are in the process of issuing equity. Choi (2007) shows that firms that 
are more dependent on banks tend to recognise losses earlier (i.e., exhibit more conservative 
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accounting), which also leads to an increase in value relevance of the income statement. 
Nelson et al (2003) show that revenue is a financial statement item that is subject to 
substantial earnings management. 
Next, we focus on research on the quality of accounting, i.e., how different ways of reporting 
revenue affects the quality of accounting. Zhang (2004) studies the adoption of new 
regulation for the software industry reporting of revenues, and finds that a lower level of 
discretion leads to an increase in the timeliness and relevance of reported revenue, but reduces 
the reliability and time-series predictability. Cerf (1975) argues that discretion in reporting 
revenues relating to long-term contracts is positive and improves the quality of accounting. 
The same argument is made by Baker and Hayes (2004) relating to the Enron case. 
These findings suggest that allowing more discretion in revenue recognition should be 
avoided, although the literature is not unanimous on the issue because the effects may be 
context-dependent. In industries with stronger incentives (such as the IT industry, where 
public offerings may cause strong incentives and high pressure for growth) stricter accounting 
standards appear advantageous. In construction, an industry characterized by a higher long-
term stability (albeit cyclical variation), more discretion may be useful. These observations 
suggest that a uniform and consistent revenue recognition model may be inferior to industry-
specific revenue recognition rules.  
Apart from the debate on the level of discretion, there is a host of papers that cover other 
quality issues. Barley (1995) suggests a probability-based model that would yield better 
results than a model based on transfer of control. Samuelson (1993) shows that the transaction 
price is not a good basis for the measurement of performance obligations. Based on a similar 
reasoning, Friedman (1978) suggests that an entire income statement based on exit prices is 
preferable. Davis (2002) focuses on internet firms and finds that firms that report grossed-up 
or barter revenue exhibit a lower value relevance of earnings. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) 
find that an asymmetric recognition of losses is relevant. In an earlier study, however, Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) show that the quality of early loss recognition depends on the market 
context of reporting entities. 
It is probably difficult to directly apply these studies in practice. What we can conclude, 
however, is that it could be relevant to recognize unrealized losses earlier than gains, which is 
similar to what the boards suggest for onerous contracts. 
Another effect from revenue recognition comes from deferred taxes. Guenther and Sansing 
(2000) study the effect of differences in financial reporting and tax for income statement 
items, including revenue. They find that such differences can affect the quality of accounting, 
an issue that may be especially relevant in Europe, where there is a multitude of tax regimes. 
Any revenue recognition accounting standard promulgated by the IASB is likely to differ 
from revenue recognized for tax purposes in many jurisdictions. Even though the IASB does 
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not (and should not) consider local tax regulation, Guenther and Sansing’s findings imply that 
the magnitude of financial reporting and tax differences could have an impact on the quality 
of accounting. 
Other studies focus on how users treat accounting information related to revenue. In an 
experimental study, Trotman and Zimmer (1986) find that subjects are functionally fixated 
and, generally, do not make adjustments for alternative revenue recognition methods when 
analyzing financial statements. This evidence suggests that (contrary to findings we discuss 
above) having a single, consistent model of revenue recognition for all transactions is useful. 
It can be expected to lead to similar transactions being treated in a similar manner, regardless 
of in which circumstance the transaction occurs, which is an advantage for functionally 
fixated investors.  
Prakash and Sinha (2009) argue that standards that require deferring the recognition of 
revenue, but the corresponding expenses are not deferred, e.g., because those expenses 
include a large portion of general indirect costs, introduce a mismatch of revenues and 
expenses. They find that if changes in deferred revenues in two periods are significant, 
investors and analysts have difficulty in forecasting future profit margins, so that analysts’ 
forecast errors increase and prices do not fully incorporate the implications of the changes in 
deferred revenues. They attribute their findings to the increased complexity of predicting 
future performance. Since the Discussion Paper does not alter the matching of costs, such 
negative consequences are likely to continue to exist.  
A different issue is studied by Clor-Proell and Nelson (2007), namely, how accounting 
standards should be written. They find that producers of accounting base their interpretation 
of standards on examples rather than the text per se. Thus, standard-setters should provide 
relevant examples, especially for areas that are conceptually new. This would particularly 
apply to the Discussion Paper on revenue recognition. 
2. Response to the main questions  
We organize our responses to the questions in the Discussion Paper along the fundamental 
issues addressed in the research surveyed.  
One question is whether it is preferable to have a single revenue recognition principle that is 
based on the entity’s contract asset or liability. From the research it is not obvious that the 
asset-liability model dominates the revenue-expense model, as the Discussion Paper claims. 
Moreover, it is not obvious if inconsistencies (e.g., those in existing standards) are really 
undesirable. There may well exist a higher-level principle the seemingly inconsistent revenue 
recognition rules obey or could obey. In addition, the proposal to net the liability arising from 
the performance obligation and the right for consideration is an aggregation of information, 
which inevitably destroys information that may be useful. Finally, empirical research suggests 
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that financial reporting is contingent on the situation, in that information based on a certain 
principle may be more or less useful in different situations. Together, this research suggests a 
need for a diversity of approaches to revenue recognition. 
Another question is concerned with the satisfaction of performance obligations. We note that 
the legal enforcement of seemingly similar claims for consideration may differ across 
jurisdictions. It is not obvious whether the economic substance or the legal existence of a 
claim is the better criterion for revenue recognition to produce decision-useful information.  
A fundamental (and open) question is the measurement of performance obligations. The 
Discussion Paper includes two approaches, the transaction price approach and the current exit 
price approach. Analytical research suggests that the transaction price approach has benefits 
(at least for performance evaluation) over the current exit price approach, which includes 
more market risk or more judgment. Moreover, recognizing day-1 gains and losses as in the 
current exit price anticipates future performance, which can be detrimental to providing 
incentives for management to perform. Empirical research suggests that early recognition of 
losses of onerous performance obligations provides useful information. Also, research 
suggests that a more timely recognition of bad news than good news is a desirable 
characteristic of financial reporting.  
A further question is the allocation of the transaction price to the performance obligations and 
the fact that contract origination costs are not included in performance obligations. Such 
ancillary costs are expensed when they occur rather than allocated to the performance 
obligations they help to generate. Analytical research suggests that all costs should be 
matched to the revenues they relate to, in order to mitigate incentives for sub-optimal 
management decisions and, thus, to serve the stewardship objective. However, a mismatch of 
revenues and costs recognition may impede the predictability of earnings.  
A more general question relates to the level of discretion in revenue recognition provided to 
reporting entities. Research suggests that discretion can be beneficial as a means of providing 
information. To the extent that discretion increases with the principles suggested in the 
Discussion Paper, this would have a benefit. The allocation of transaction price to different 
performance obligations may be an example. 
Research indicates a functional fixation in the interpretation of revenue related transactions. 
Then the control model may not be optimal from a user perspective, especially as it pertains to 
constructions contracts. If the control model results in revenue recognized when a contract is 
completed, it would be difficult for financial reporting users to see through to the economic 
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